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Summary Box 
What is already known on this topic:  
Detailed models of individual interactions, which may take many hours of supercomputer 
time to run, are a reliable way to predict the course of an epidemic, and to investigate 
counterfactual scenarios. 
The CovidSim model is the leading UK model, well-tested in influenza epidemics.  
What the study adds:  The predictions of the Imperial College model, including the 
inevitability of a second wave, were replicated and shown to be well realised in practice.  
Detailed investigation of the model show that it predicted that social distancing and 
school closures would suppress first-wave case numbers at the cost of a higher overall 
number of deaths, which number over 200,000 in all scenarios without a vaccine.  
Print Abstract 
Study Question: What information was available to government regarding school 
closure in March 2020 when the lockdown decision was taken. 
Methods: We ran calculations using the CovidSim code which implements the Imperial 
College individual-based model of the COVID epidemic. This model was used to produce 
“Report 9”, generally regarded as “The Science” behind the lockdown decision. We used 
only input data available in March 2020, but have adapted the code to more closely match 
the interventions which actually took place. By more detailed data analysis, we 
investigate the reason why general social distancing, school closures and isolation of 
younger people were predicted to increase the final number of deaths.  
Study Answer and Limitations:  CovidSim gives a good description of the epidemic, and 
predicts that isolation of less vulnerable people increases the final death toll.  The excess 
deaths are postponed to second and subsequent waves, and could be averted by a 
successful vaccination programme, which is not explicitly modelled.  
What the study adds:  We now know that the predictions of the Imperial College model, 
including the inevitability of a second wave, were well realised in practice.  Furthermore, 
Government was already aware in March that social distancing and school closures would 
suppress first-wave case numbers at the cost of higher overall deaths. 
1 Abstract 
Objective: to establish what information was available to government when the 
lockdown decision was taken. 
Design: Independent calculations using data known in March 2020 with the CovidSim 
code which implements the Imperial College individual-based model of the COVID 
epidemic.  
Main Outcome Measures: Replication of summary data reported to SAGE.  Detailed 
study of unpublished results, especially the effect of school closures.  
Results:  CovidSim would have given a good forecast of the subsequent data if initialised 
with a reproduction number (R0) about 3.5. We confirm the little-reported forecast that 
school closures and isolation of younger people were predicted to increase the final 
number of deaths, albeit postponed to a second and subsequent waves. We find that 
prompt interventions are highly effective at reducing peak ICU demand, but they also 
prolong the epidemic, in some cases causing more deaths long term. In the absence of an 
effective vaccination programme, none of the proposed mitigation strategies reduces the 
predicted total number of deaths below 200,000. This happens because COVID mortality 
is highly skewed towards older age groups.  
Conclusions:  It was predicted in March 2020 that a broad lockdown, as opposed to a 
focus on shielding the most vulnerable, would reduce immediate ICU demand at the cost 
of more deaths long-term.   The optimal strategy for saving lives in a COVID pandemic is 
different from that anticipated for an influenza epidemic with different mortality age-
profile. 
 
2 Introduction 
The UK national response to the coronavirus crisis has been widely reported as being 
primarily led by modelling based on work at Imperial College [1], although other models 
have been considered1. The key paper [2], which we will refer to as “Report 9”, 
investigated a number of scenarios using this code with the best parameterisation 
available at the time. Contrary to popular perception, the lockdown which was then 
implemented was not specifically modelled in this work. As the pandemic has progressed, 
the parameterisation has been continually improved with new data as it arrives. The main 
 
1 throughout this paper, we maintain the distinction between epidemiological “model”, and software 
implementations as “code” 
conclusions of Report 9 were not especially surprising. COVID has a mortality around 1% 
[3], so an epidemic in a susceptible population of 70M people would cause many 
hundreds of thousands of deaths. In early March there may have been a case-doubling 
time of around 3 days in the UK [4], meaning that within a week COVID cases could go 
from accounting for a minority of available ICU spaces, to exceeding capacity. 
Furthermore, with an onset delay of over a week, and limited or delayed testing and 
reporting in place, there would be very little measurable warning of the explosion in ICU 
demand. However, in one table in Report 9 it is shown that closing schools reduces the R 
number, but has the unexpected effect of increasing total deaths. In this paper, we 
reproduce the main results from Report 9, and explain why, in the framework of the 
model, these counter-intuitive results were obtained. We chose not to attempt to re-
parameterize the model, because we wanted to replicate the information available to 
policymakers at the time, specifically highlighting policies for which “suppressing the 
outbreak” and “saving lives” were conflicting choices. 
3 Methods 
The CovidSim model is developed from an influenza pandemic model [1,5,6]. The original 
code used for Report 9 has not been released. However, the Ferguson group has led an 
effort with Microsoft, GitHub and the Royal Society RAMP-initiative to recreate the model: 
this version has been stringently externally validated [7]. We used GitHub tagged version 
0.14.0 + additional patches dated before 03-06-2020 to which we refer the reader for full 
technical details [8]. Input files relevant to Report 9 were supplied by Ferguson et al. [9] 
and were included in the GitHub release. CovidSim models the UK at the most detailed 
level possible without requiring personal data. The model simulates millions of individual 
“people” going about their daily business at home, within their community and at schools, 
universities, places of work, hospitals etc. The geographical representation of the UK is 
taken from census data, so the “people” in each area have appropriate distribution of age, 
health, wealth and household size. Simulated schools and workplaces have “people” with 
appropriate numbers, age distribution and commuting distances in line with national 
averages for each. The network of interactions is age dependent: people interact mainly 
with their own age group and with family, teachers and carers. The virus initially infects 
random members of this network of interacting co-workers, strangers, friends and 
family. Whenever an infected person meets a non-infected one, there is a probability that 
the virus spreads. This probability depends on the time and proximity of the interaction, 
and the infectiousness of the person given their stage of disease. Infected people may 
become hospitalised, and may die, with probability dependent on age, pre-existing 
conditions and stage of disease. This extremely detailed model is then parameterised 
using the best available expert clinical and behavioural evidence [5], with the 
coronavirus-specific features being updated as more data comes in from the worldwide 
epidemic [8]. Therefore, the model has the required complexity to consider non-
pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), which reduce the number of interactions between 
“people” in the model (see Table.1). To predict policymaking, it is assumed that these 
interventions are implemented when ICU bed occupation is observed to reach a 
particular “trigger” level. The model contains far more realistic detail than the data 
available. So results are averages over many runs with different starting conditions, all of 
which are consistent with known data. The real epidemic is just one of these possibilities, 
so the code determines the range of scenarios which should be planned for. This is 
particularly important when there are low numbers of localised outbreaks: the prediction 
that local spikes will occur somewhere is reliable, and the most likely places can be 
identified, but predicting exactly when and where is not possible with the level of data 
available. All interventions reduce the reproduction “R” number, and slow the spread of 
the epidemic. However, a counter-intuitive result presented in Report 9 (their Table 3 
and Table A1) is the prediction that, once all other considered interventions were in 
place, the additional closure of schools and universities would increase the total number 
of deaths. Similarly, adding general social distancing (SD) to a scenario involving case 
isolation and household quarantine, with appropriate estimates for compliance, was also 
projected to increase the total number of deaths. 
3.1 Patient and public involvement 
Patients or the public were not involved in the design, or conduct, or reporting, or 
dissemination plans of our research. All data used was retrieved from existing, public 
sources as referenced. 
4 Results 
The result tables for the scenarios presented in the original report were 
straightforwardly reproduced by averaging over 10 simulation runs with the same 
random number seeds as used in Report 9. The simulations are run for 800 days, with 
day 1 being 01 January 2020. The intervention period lasts for 3 months (91 days), with 
some interventions extended for an additional 30 days. The mitigation scenarios in 
Report 9 considered R0=2.2 and R0=2.4, but we initially only considered R0= 2.4. As 
highlighted in [8] the results we obtain here are not precisely identical to those in Report 
9, since they are an average over 10 stochastic realisations, the population dataset has 
changed to one that is open-source, and the algorithm used to generate the household-
to-place network has been modified to be deterministic. The stochasticity gives a variance 
around 5% in total deaths and ICU demand, which explains the discrepancies with Report 
9. More significant is the uncertainty of the timing of the peak of the infections, which is 
around ±5 days. We compare these predictions to the death rates from the actual 
trajectory of the disease [10,11]. We note that NHS England stopped publishing critical 
bed occupancy in March 2020[12], so it is not possible to compare ICU data from the 
model with reality. 
In Table 1 we show the critical care (ICU) bed demand, while in Table 2 we show total 
deaths, both using the same mitigation scenarios as presented in Report 9.  As in Report 
9, for each mitigation scenario we consider a range of ICU triggers.  In Table 1 we report 
the peak ICU bed demand across the full simulation for each trigger, as was presented in 
Report 9, but also include the peak ICU bed demand during the period of the intervention 
(first wave).  The latter we define as the period during which general social distancing 
(SD) was in place, when implemented.   
In Table 2 we also report the total number of deaths across the entire simulation, and also 
the number of deaths at the end of the first wave, again defined as the time at which 
general social distancing was lifted.   
The full simulation numbers we present in Tables 1 and 2 are essentially the same as 
those presented in Table A1 in Report 9.  As discussed earlier, the small difference 
between our numbers and those presented in Report 9 are probably because these are 
averaged over 10 stochastic realisations, the population dataset is slightly different, and 
the algorithm for generating the household-to-place network was changed to make it 
deterministic.  Table 2 also illustrates the counter-intuitive result that adding school 
closures to CI_HQ_SDOL70 increases the total number of deaths across the full simulation.  
Moreover, it shows that social distancing of over-70s only is more effective than general 
social distancing. 
It is clear from Tables 1 and 2 that in some mitigation scenarios peak ICU demand, and 
most deaths, occur during the period when the intervention is in place. There are, 
however, other scenarios where the opposite is true.  
The reason for this is illustrated in Figure 2.  The solid lines are the same mitigation 
scenarios as presented in Figure 2 of Report 9.  We also show some additional scenarios 
(dashed lines) not shown in Figure 2 of Report 9, but which are included in Tables 1 and 
2 and also in the Tables in Report 9. 
In the simulations presented here, the main interventions are in place for 3 months and 
end on about day 200 (some interventions are extended for an additional 30 days).  
Figure 2 shows that some intervention scenarios lead to a single wave that occurs during 
the period in which the interventions are in place.  Hence, the peak ICU bed demand 
occurs during this period, as do most deaths.      
There are, however, some interventions that suppress the infection so that there is then 
a second wave once the interventions are lifted.  For example, adding place closures to 
case isolation, household quarantine, and social distancing of those over 70 substantially 
suppresses the infection during the intervention period when compared to the same 
scenario without place closures.  However, this suppression then leads to a second wave 
with a higher peak ICU bed demand than during the intervention period, and total deaths 
that exceed that of the same scenario without place closures.   
We therefore conclude that the somewhat counter-intuitive results that school closures 
lead to more deaths are a consequence of the addition of some interventions suppressing 
the first wave, and failing to prioritise protection of the most vulnerable.  
When the interventions are lifted, there is still a large population of people who are 
susceptible and a substantial number of people who are infected. This then leads to 
second wave of infections that can result in more deaths, but at a later time.  Further 
lockdowns lead to a repeating series of waves of infection, unless herd immunity is 
achieved by vaccination, which is not considered in the model. 
A similar result occurs in some of the scenarios involving general social distancing (SD). 
For example, adding general social distancing to case isolation and household quarantine 
also strongly suppresses the infection during the intervention period, but then leads to a 
second wave that actually has a higher peak ICU demand than for the equivalent scenario 
without general social distancing. 
Figure 3 provides an explanation for how place closure interventions affect the second 
wave, and why an extra intervention may result in more deaths than the equivalent 
scenario without this intervention.  In the CI_HQ_SDOL70 scenario, without closures, a 
single peak of cases is seen. The data is broken-down into age groups, showing that 
younger people contribute most to the total cases, but that deaths come primarily from 
older groups. Adding the place closure intervention (and keeping all other things 
constant) gives the behaviour shown in the second row of plots. The initial peak is greatly 
suppressed, but the end of closures seems to prompt a second peak of cases amongst 
younger people. This then leads to a third, more deadly, peak of cases affecting the elderly 
when SDOL70 is removed. The postponement in the spread means there are more 
infectious younger people to infect the older age groups, a much larger fraction of whom 
then die.   
One criticism of school closure is that reduced contact at school leads to increased contact 
at home; meaning children infect high-risk adults rather than low-risk children. We 
investigated this by increasing the infection rate at home to an extremely high value. 
Figure 1 shows that this makes an insignificant difference compared to the overall effect 
of adding school closures2 to the other interventions.   
4.1 CovidSim's description of a second wave 
Although Report 9 does discuss the possibility that relaxing the interventions could lead 
to a second peak later in the year, we wanted to  explore this in more detail, using the 
latest set of parameter files included in the GitHub repository [8]. 
The interventions we consider are place closures (PC), case isolation (CI), household 
quarantine (HQ) and general social distancing (SD) which are implemented using the 
PC_CI_HQ_SD parameter file. Specifically, we use the parameter file available in the 
data/param_files sub-directory of the GitHub respository.  The only modification is to 
change the duration of the interventions to be 91 days.  
These interventions start in late March (day 83) and last for 3 months (91 days).  These 
simulations are also initialised so that there are about 15600 deaths by day 100 (April 
9th) in all scenarios, mostly infected before the interventions were implemented.3 This 
compares with Report 9 initiation which used then-reported deaths to March 14th.  
The results are presented in Figure 4. The top panel shows cumulative deaths, with data 
from [11] and [13], while the bottom panel shows ICU bed demand per 100000 people.  
Although our simulations do include Northern Ireland, the available reported data does 
not.  Therefore, the simulation results, and data, presented in Figure 4 are for England, 
Wales and Scotland only. We also consider a range of R0 values and find that values higher 
 
2 Despite the description of place closure interventions in Table 2 of Report 9, university closures are not 
included in the (PC_)CI_HQ_SDOL70 scenario parameter files [9]. 
3This is implemented by modifying the [Number of deaths accumulated before alert] parameter in the 
preUK_2.0.txt parameter file. 
than those considered in Report 9 best reproduce the data, with an R0 value between 3 
and 3.5 probably providing the best fit.  This is consistent with the analysis presented in 
[14], but we acknowledge that the data could also be fitted by changes to the other 
scenario parameters.  In both panels we also show the “Do nothing” scenario for R0 = 3.0.  
The ICU bed demand for the scenarios presented in Figure 4 show that the interventions 
are predicted to substantially reduce the ICU demand. 
Random antibody tests at the time of writing suggest some 5% of the population have 
been exposed to coronavirus [13,15].  In the context of modelling a second wave, this is 
small.  In the absence of interventions, predictions for the second wave are similar to 
those for the first. Assuming a similar response to a new wave, that exposure gives 
immunity, and that no vaccine become available, up to ten waves can be anticipated. 
In practice, it seems that mandatory and voluntary interventions will continue, and 
maintain the reproduction number close to 1.  This will keep ICU demand manageable, 
but it is worth noting that R=1 is also the value which prolongs the need for interventions 
for the longest time. At this level, the inhomogeneity of transmissions, particularly the 
unpredictability of superspreading events, becomes critical.  Despite the level of detail of 
the model, there is insufficient data to model real people: we saw that for a major national 
epidemic this introduces an uncertainty of about 5 days in the predictions.  At a local level, 
and with a lower R number, this uncertainty is greatly increased: it is impossible to 
predict when a particular town will suffer an outbreak (specifically, different towns are 
hit on different runs).   
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we used the recently released CovidSim code [8] to reproduce the mitigation 
scenarios presented in mid-March in Report 9 [2].  The motivation behind this was that 
some of the results presented in Report 9 suggested that the addition of extra 
interventions may actually increase the total number of deaths.  
We find that the CovidSim code reliably reproduces the results from Report-9, and that 
the model underlying CovidSim can accurately track the UK death-rate data.  To do so 
does require an adjustment to the parameters, a slightly higher R0 than considered in 
Report 9, and results in an earlier start to the epidemic than suggested by Report 9. We 
emphasize, though, that the unavailability of these parameters in early-March is not a 
failure of the model.  
We confirm that adding school and university closures to case isolation, household 
quarantine, and social distancing of those over 70 would lead to more deaths when 
compared to the equivalent scenario without the school and university closures.  
Similarly, general social distancing was also projected to reduce the number of cases but 
increase the total number of deaths compared with social distancing over 70s only.  We 
note that, in assessing the impact of school closures, UK policy advice has concentrated 
on reducing total number of cases, not number of deaths [16]. 
The qualitative explanation for this is that within all mitigation scenarios in the model, 
the epidemic ends with widespread immunity with a large fraction of the population 
infected. Strategies which minimise deaths involve having the infected fraction primarily 
in the low-risk younger age groups, e.g. focussing stricter social distancing measures on 
care-homes where people are likely to die rather than schools where they are not. 
Optimal death reduction strategies are different from those aimed at reducing the ICU 
burden, and different again from those which lower the overall case rate.  
We find that scenarios that are very effective when the interventions are in place, can 
then lead to subsequent waves during which most of the infections, and deaths, occur. 
Our comparison of updated model results with the published death data suggests that a 
similar second wave will occur later this year if interventions are fully lifted.   
Since this paper was written, UK policy has moved to more local interventions.  CovidSim 
models the geography of all towns, but the simulated people are only representative of 
the true population.  This uncertainty means that the model cannot reliably predict which 
town will suffer an outbreak. Specifically, whereas the timing of the national outbreak is 
uncertain by days, the timing of an outbreak in a given town is uncertain by months. 
CovidSim is the most precise model available, but massively more personal data would 
be needed to obtain reliable local predictions.  
Finally, we reemphasize that the results in this work are not intended to be detailed 
predictions for the second wave.  Rather, we are re-examining the evidence available 
from CovidSim at the start of the epidemic. More accurate information is now available 
about the compliance with lockdown rules and age-dependent mortality.  The difficulty 
in shielding care-home residents is a particularly important piece of health data that was 
not available to modellers at the outset.  
Nevertheless, in almost all mitigation scenarios, CovidSim epidemics eventually finish 
with widespread immunity, and the final death toll depends primarily on the age 
distribution of those infected, not the total number. 
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What is already known on this subject 
  
The Covid-Sim model is the most detailed individual-based model of the UK appropriate 
for simulation of the spread of an epidemic. 
The UK-wide lockdown was implemented as a highly effective way of reducing epidemic 
spread. 
 
What this study adds 
The model used for "Report 9" predicts that, in the absence of a vaccine, school closures 
result in more overall deaths than not closing schools.  
The code used, and results obtained in “Report 9” are independently verified and 
provided a good description of the subsequent spread of the epidemic at the national 
level, except that the R0 parameter was set too low. 
Mitigating a COVID epidemic requires different strategy from an influenza epidemic, with 
more focus on shielding the elderly and vulnerable. 
While total infections are at a low level, coronavirus manifests as localised spikes. 
Currently available data is insufficient to reliably predict exactly where these will occur.  
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Trigger Time  PC CI CI_HQ CI_HQ_SD CI_SD CI_HQ_S
DOL70 
PC_CI_HQ_SD
OL70 
0.1 1st wave 152 119 87 8 20 62 33 
0.1 total 152 119 87 115 84 62 51 
0.3 1st wave 153 119 87 10 22 62 34 
0.3 total 153 119 87 115 73 62 48 
1 1st wave 154 119 87 11 22 62 35 
1 total 154 119 87 104 59 62 37 
3 1st wave 159 119 87 13 22 62 37 
3 total 159 119 87 82 40 62 37 
Table 1: Table showing peak ICU bed demand (UK-wide, in thousands) for different intervention 
scenarios: home isolation of suspect cases (CI), home quarantine of family members (HQ), general 
social distancing (SD), social distancing of those over 70 (SDOL70) and “place closures” (PC), 
specifically the closure of schools and universities. More details of these NPIs are provided in Table 2 
of Report 9, which we reproduce in Appendix Figure 5. For each trigger value of cumulative ICU cases 
(again in thousands) we show the peak ICU demand, and the peak during the first wave when the 
interventions were in place (which is sometimes the same). 
 
 
Trigger Time  PC CI CI_HQ CI_HQ_SD CI_SD CI_HQ_S
DOL70 
PC_CI_HQ_SD
OL70 
0.1 1st wave 418 354 252 21 39 177 75 
0.1 total 496 416 355 440 402 262 357 
0.3 1st wave 456 378 281 32 58 200 104 
0.3 total 495 416 355 437 390 261 356 
1 1st wave 479 398 310 48 86 223 139 
1 total 494 416 355 428 370 261 351 
3 1st wave 490 407 325 70 114 237 172 
3 total 495 416 355 411 347 262 342 
Table 2: Table showing total deaths (UK-wide, in thousands) for different intervention scenarios and 
different ICU triggers. For each trigger value of cumulative ICU cases (thousands) we show the total 
deaths across the full simulation, and during the first wave. Bold numbers are the minimum achievable 
 
Figure 1: Effect of place closure. The CI_HQ_SDOL70 and PC_CI_HQ_SDOL70 intervention scenarios are 
compared. After the trigger at 100 cumulative ICU cases, all the interventions are in place for 91 days: 
the general social distancing runs to day 194, and the enhanced social distancing for over 70s runs for 
an extra 30 days. With Place Closure (PC), we also show the effect of increasing the amount of in-
household interactions by a factor (home) of up to 2. %the value of the relative household contact 
parameter is varied from 1.0 to 2.0 This shifts cases from first to later waves, but the additional PC 
intervention always leads to an increase in total cases and deaths. 
 
Figure 2: Flattening the curve. The solid lines are the same scenarios as presented in Figure 2 of report 
9.  We also show  three additional scenarios (dashed lines) for R0 = 2.4 which are summarised in Tables 
1 and 2. The PC_CI_HQ_SDOL70 scenario minimises peak ICU bed demand, but prolongs the epidemic, 
resulting in more ICU cases and deaths.  These illustrate why adding place closures (PC) to a scenario 
with case isolation (CI), household quarantine (HQ) and social distancing of those over 70 (SDOL70) 
can lead to more deaths than the equivalent scenario without place closures. Doing so suppresses the 
infection when the interventions are present, but leads to a second wave when they are lifted, which 
happens on around day 200. The total number of deaths in the CI_HQ_SDOL70 scenario is 260,000, 
while for PC_CI_HQ_SDOL70 it is 350,000.  Similarly, comparing general social distancing (SD) with 
equivalent scenarios without SD, the second wave peak in the CI_HQ_SD scenario is actually higher 
than the first wave peak in the CI_HQ scenario. 
 
Figure 3: Simulated values for daily virus cases (left) and deaths (right), for scenarios CI_HQ_SDOL70 
(top) and PC_CI_HQ_SDOL70 (bottom). Interventions are triggered by reaching 100 cumulative ICU 
cases. After the trigger, all the interventions are in place for 91 days: the general social distancing runs 
to day 194, and the enhanced social distancing for over 70s runs for an extra 30 days. Results are 
broken down into age categories as indicated, with SDOL70 interventions affecting the three oldest 
groups. In the CI_HQ_SDOL70 scenario we see a single peak of cases, with greatest infection in the 
younger age groups but most deaths occurring in the older. In the PC_CI_HQ_SDOL70 scenario we see 
three peaks in the plot of daily cases, with the first peak occurring at a similar time for CI_HQ_SDOL70 
above, but with reduced severity. The second peak seems to be a response to the ending of Place 
Closure (PC), and most affects the younger age groups, therefore having little impact on the total 
deaths. The third peak affects the older groups, leading to a significant increase in the total deaths. 
 
Figure 4: Refit of the CovidSim March parameterization based on death data through to June. The top 
panel shows cumulative deaths, with data from [11] and [13], while the bottom panel shows ICU bed 
demand per 100000 people. We considered a range of R0 values and find that values higher than that 
considered in Report 9 best reproduce the data.  A good fit also requires us to assume that the epidemic 
started earlier than was previously suggested in Report 9.  We see that CovidSim provides a good fit 
to the data with a value of R0 between 3 and 3.5 and (inset) predicts that the ICU demand would 
probably be limited to around 10 per 100000. 
 
Figure 5: Table defining the interventions considered in CovidSim copied from Report 9.  
